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The tabloidization of the Brexit campaign:  
Power to the (British) people? 
Abstract 
Consistent with a populist script, evoking the people has been a nodal point in the 
discursive unfolding of Brexit and its legitimation. This paper focuses on the 
mediatisation of the Brexit referendum campaign in a corpus of online British 
tabloids to address the critical question of how the people in whose name Brexit was 
(de)legitimised were discursively constructed and mobilized. The argument put 
forward is that the legitimation of Brexit was achieved through exclusionary 
definitions of the people and through strategies of fear, resentment and 
empowerment. This discursive framing points to the wider question of the 
instrumental role that a large section of the British tabloid press has had not simply 
in the contingency of referendum but also in the longer-term legitimation chain of 
Brexit and in its institutionalisation and more generally in the historical priming of 
their readership with negative coverage of the UK/EU relationship.  
 




"this will be a victory for real people, a victory for ordinary people, a 
victory for decent people” (N. Farage, quoted in The Sun, 24/6/2016) 
 
Reference to the people has always been at the core of populist discourses. 
As epitomised by the above statement pronounced by UKIP’s leader Nigel Farage as 
the early Brexit referendum polls were announced on the morning of 24th June 2016, 
evoking the people has also been crucial to the discursive legitimation of Brexit (see 
also Bennett, 2019). This legitimacy process has seen the British media, and in 
particular the tabloid press, playing a key role among a variety of institutional and 
other actors. Focusing on ‘tabloid populism’ (see below) as instrumental in the 
diffusion of populist discourses, this paper addresses the question of how the people 
in whose name Brexit was (de)legitimised were constructed and mobilized in/by the 
British tabloid press during the Brexit referendum campaign. More specifically, this 
aim has been operationalised around the following questions: i) which ideological 
framing of Brexit by the tabloid press contributed to (de)legitimise ‘leave’ and 





and antagonised in the discourses of tabloids and iii) how were the people 
linguistically characterised? 
By addressing these questions the contribution of this paper is twofold. 
Firstly, it offers evidence of how tabloid populism was a driving force of the Brexit 
vote and how it contributed to the diffusion and legitimation of populist discourses 
shoring up the ‘critical juncture’ of Brexit and its institutionalisation (Zappettini & 
Krzyzanowski, 2019; see also special issue on ‘Brexit as a Social & Political Crisis: 
Discourses in Media & Politics’ in Critical Discourse Studies Journal 2019, 16:4). 
Secondly, it contributes to the advancement of the literature on the relation between 
language and politics by approaching the people and (tabloid) populism at the critical 
intersection of increasingly mediated forms of political communication. In this sense, 
this article interprets journalism as ‘an argumentative discourse genre’ (Richardson, 
2007:64) that combines evaluative and factual content to promote particular 
worldviews to the audience (Van Dijk, 2013). Crucially, journalists act as ‘frame 
gatekeepers’ (Bruggemann, 2014) in as much as they have the power to reproduce 
and reframe discourses from extra-media actors while fitting specific 
organizational/political agendas as well as local/national cultures. For example, in 
reporting Brexit as a crisis, journalists across Europe have framed the nature of such 
crisis through narratives that differ substantially from those used by their British 
counterpart (Krzyżanowski, 2019). Likewise, more than other European press 
cultures, the British press has framed the narration of immigration around discourses 
of ‘social burden’ and security (McNeil and Karstens, 2018). Similar considerations 
apply to the wider historical reporting of EU political news, with a large section of 
the tabloid press producing anti-EU propaganda based on spurious information and 
anti-foreign sentiment (Weymouth and Anderson 2014; Bingham and Conboy, 2015) 
which have gained the British written press the undesirable title of ‘the least trusted 
in Europe’ (European Broadcasting Unit, 2017).  Thus, while the British press 
coverage of the referendum mainly reflected discourses produced by institutional 
actors in the campaign (Levy et al., 2016), the tabloids’ role in giving exposure to a 
selection of such discourses can hardly be overestimated when considering how the 
cumulative effect (Bell, 1996) on audiences reinforced existing pre-legitimising 
narratives (Krzyżanowski, 2014).  
The argument put forward in this paper is that a large section of the tabloid 
press framed the choice over Brexit by providing the public with an imagined sense 
of empowerment over a perceived threat to the British nation and its popular 
sovereignty. Most tabloids (namely the Mail1-Sun-Express triad) associated this 
threat with immigration and EU policies which, in turn, were largely represented as 
adverse to the interests of the (British) people. Within this discursive logic, Brexit 
tended to be primarily legitimised by tabloids through strategies of fear, resentment 
and empowerment which relied on antagonistic representations of opposed groups 
of people (i.e. the British people and its enemies) and the exclusionary dichotomy of 
us and them. This discursive framing also points to the wider question of the 
aforementioned instrumental role that a large section of the British tabloid press has 
                                                 
1 By Mail I refer to The Daily Mail but not to its sister publication Mail of Sunday which on Brexit had a 




had not simply in the contingency of referendum but also in the longer-term 
legitimation chain of Brexit and in its institutionalisation. Crucially, in the 
tabloidization of the Brexit referendum campaign, not only was the Mail-Sun-
Express triad able to reproduce and amplify the key Leave arguments, but these titles 
also reproduced their own ideological pro-Brexit agenda capitalising on historical 
anti-EU/populist discourses that had extensively primed the readership to a 
normalisation of Brexit long before the referendum became a reality. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: first a conceptualisation 
of populism at the intersection of interrelated political and communicative discursive 
dimensions is discussed in Section 2. Section 3 focuses on the historical role of the 
British tabloid press and on their role in the mediatization of the Brexit referendum. 
Section 4 discusses data and methodology used for the analysis which is 
subsequently presented in Section 5. Critical conclusions are drawn in Section 6. 
 
2. Tabloid Populism: ‘the people’ and/in the media  
 
Defining populism is notoriously problematic as the literature on the nature and the 
boundaries of the populist phenomenon fuzzily spans across overlapping ideological, 
political, social and communicative dimensions (see for example Wodak and 
Krzyżanowski, 2017). Taking up Stavrakakis (2017: 527) this article refers to 
populism as: 
 “a specific type of discourse which claims to express popular 
interests and to represent associated identities and demands (the 
“will of the people”) against an “establishment” or elite, which is 
seen as undermining them and forestalling their satisfaction”.  
 
At its core, the populist ideology therefore revolves primarily around two basic 
elements: a dualistic conceptualisation of society as made up of antagonistic groups 
and a justification of actions in reference to the people, their interests, and their will 
(see also Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013). As Canovan (2005) notes, however, while 
the people is always a core element of populist narratives (and the often self-
referential etymological and conceptual basis of how most scholars understand 
populism) the term is also highly problematic to circumscribe semantically and, in 
fact, derives its very rhetorical appeal from the way it can be synecdochally 
deployed2. The problematic definition of the people is also reflected in the interplay 
between populist discourses and democratic processes, in particular in the legitimacy 
                                                 
2 The indefiniteness of (the) people is even more acute in English, where the same term can denote both 
individuals in a general sense and more specific collective actors (citizens or subjects), two concepts which 
are otherwise lexically differentiated in other languages (see for example  popolo/gente/persone in Italian 
and equivalent terms in cognate Romance languages or Volk/Menschen/Personen in German). In English, 
this semantic differentiation can partly be rendered by the pluralisation people/peoples and by the use of the 




of political decisions which, in the Rousseaian ideal of republican democracy, are 
supposedly exercised in the name of the people (popular sovereignty) and deemed 
the expression of a volonté generale (people’s will). However, while the Rousseauian 
conception of volonté generale pluralistically supports  a ‘common good’, in populist 
discourses the people is typically de-plurilized and its will instrumentally reified as 
one monolithic entity (Freeden, 2017). As Laclau (2005) pointed out, therefore, 
rather than existing a priori as a political subject, in all appeals to popular 
sovereignty the people is constituted discursively through the articulation and 
aggregation of specific social demands associated with different ‘floating signifiers’ 
(e.g. freedom, control, nation, etc.) and through the antagonisation between the 
people and its enemies i.e. those who forestall their demands. While reference to the 
people is thus virtually unavoidable (and according to Stavrakakis, 2014 indeed 
desirable for basic democratic debates) the boundaries between people 
insiders/outsiders are often arbitrarily manufactured and mobilised in discourse 
(Wodak, 2017). Trading on these premises, to understand the production and 
distribution of populist discourses one has to examine not only the linguistic act of 
naming the people but, crucially, also the actors involved in such process as well as 
the effects of such discourses. Such exercise carries specific significance in relation 
to the resurgence of populism of the last decade both at European and global level 
(Stavrakakis, 2014; Zienkowski and Breeze, 2019) in which the logics of ‘we, the 
people’ - articulated along ethnic and economic cleavages and narratives of threat, 
betrayal and resentment (Wodak, 2017) – has been highly mediatised and politicised 
(Krzyżanowski et al., 2018). 
As political discourses are produced and consumed in a public sphere 
increasingly reliant on mediatised forms of communication (Esser and Strömbäck, 
2014) it is crucial to consider the media not just as key communicative platforms but 
also as potentially influential actors in the social (re)production of populist logics. 
The media ability to shape social reality by naturalising certain selected views of the 
world and the way that specific discourses are framed and channelled by newspapers 
- thus contributing to construing the large cognitive models whereby public opinion 
understands political and social phenomena and upon which citizens exercise 
political agency - have been widely recognized (McCombs  2009; Van Dijk, 2013; 
Scheufele, 2000).  
However, while this body of literature has clearly acknowledged the media’s 
power to set the agenda by instigating and polarising public debates, the interplay 
between the (re)production of populist ideologies in the public opinion, editorial 
choices, journalistic practices and audience agency is complex. The role of the media 
in the diffusion of populist discourses has been differently described as of ‘facilitator’ 
or ‘inhibitor’ (Wettstein et al., 2018) with the audience differently seen as performing 
passive/active roles (Aalberg et al, 2016). It has been argued that media coverage of 
populism can give ‘publicity oxygen’ to certain discourses whether such coverage is 
positive or negative (Mazzoleni, 2008) but, equally, that the exclusion of populist 
demands from news agendas may fuel populist forms of anti-elite sentiment and the 
public delegitimization of the media as the latter are seen conspiring with ‘the 




Whilst the jury on establishing a direction of causality between a newspaper’s 
political alignment, news coverage and the political attitudes of its readership is still 
out, this paper sides with Mazzoleni’s view that the rise of most recent populist 
phenomena in Europe has fed on some sort of ‘media complicity’ through which the 
press has more or less intentionally given “increased visibility and significant 
reverberation of the populist message among a wide audience” (Mazzoleni, 
2008:50). In this respect, the role of the European tabloid press has attracted 
particular interest and some scholars have referred to ‘tabloid populism’3 
(Mazzoleni, 2008, Bos & Brants, 2014, Krämer, 2014) as a specific ideological 
worldview, as well as a discursive practice and a communicative genre, which is 
distinct from the quality press and which has been conspicuously complicit in the 
diffusion of populist discourses. 
Firstly, the tabloid press differs from other forms of journalism in the 
ideological understanding of its own social role, namely that is to oppose the 
“excesses of political correctness and [..] liberal intellectualism” (Krämer, 2018) 
rather than foster an informed civic debate. Secondly, in terms of content, tabloid 
journalism aims at the creation of newsworthiness around ‘soft’ content and opinions 
rather than substantive and verified facts with a tendency to focus on personalities 
rather than issues and on the ‘cultural compression’ (Conboy, 2004) of complex 
arguments into simplistic and catchy lines. Thirdly, these ideological and discursive 
orientations are often accompanied by a ‘demotic’ and vernacular discursive style 
characterised by highly emotive, sensational and everyday language (Conboy, 2004) 
chiming with the communicative style increasingly adopted by politicians (Jagers 
and Walgrave, 2007). These interrelated dimensions have contributed to make the 
tabloid press a prominent mediatising actor in the new ‘politics of popular’ by both 
nurturing populist tendencies within media institutions themselves and by 
representing a specific journalistic style through which world phenomena are 
popularized (Krämer, 2014). Hence, on the one hand, tabloids have actively taken up 
specific discourses contributing to the “legitimization of the issues, key-words and 
communication styles typical of populist leaders” (Mazzoleni, 2008:50). On the 
other hand, even if not explicitly aligned with populist movements, tabloids, like 
populist politicians, assert a rapport with the people/audience, an ability to think and 
speak as one of them and for them (Moffit and Tormey, 2013) that reifies the people 
as both the subject and the main audience of their discursive performance (Arditi, 
2007).  
 The next section discusses the interplay between these ideological and 
stylistic elements focusing on the British tabloid press, their historical framing of the 
UK/EU relationship and the more specific production of populist discourses around 




                                                 
3 The term tabloid connotes the ideological stance associated with the format. Although recently some 
broadsheets such as the Guardian are published in a tabloid version, in my following discussion I refer to 




3. The tabloidization of Euronews and the framing of 
the Brexit campaign in the British tabloid press  
 
The British press has historically being instrumental in constructing public 
perceptions of the UK-EU relationship (Carey and Burton 2004; Bingham and 
Conboy, 2015). Since the emergence of the EU, most British newspapers have 
overtly aligned with one political view or ideology over European issues. Although 
with some caveats (including the fact that editorial stances on Europe have 
sometimes shifted), one could crudely say that while most broadsheets have 
portrayed the UK-EU relationship from Europositive to softly Eurosceptic positions, 
the majority of ‘red top’ tabloids (as well as some broadsheets such as The Times 
and The Daily Telegraph) have typically supported hard Eurosceptic to Europhobic 
views.  In particular, titles such as The Daily Mail, The Sun and The Daily Express 
have been historically vocal about their anti-EU views, promoting various ‘crusades’ 
around different Euro-myths and through discursive strategies of simplification, 
‘moral panic’ and blame (Daddow, 2012; Weymouth and Anderson 2014; Hameleers 
et al. 2016, 2017). In this sense, the overarching discourse of some British tabloids 
has been conspicuous for the trivialisation of EU politics (e.g. The  Sun’s infamous 
headline  ‘Stick it up yours Delors’) and for portraying the UK as a ‘victim’ of 
Brussels ‘conspiracy plot’ (Levy et. al., 2016).  As Berry (2016:14) puts it, the anti-
EU stance of a portion of the British press meant that ‘before the [Brexit referendum] 
campaign even began large parts of the public had been primed by the media to be 
Euro-sceptic’. 
In the run up to the vote the media partisan alignment polarised and the press 
messages echoing the official Leave/Remain campaigns intensified thus contributing 
to further frame the referendum debate along the agenda that had already been 
institutionalised through the appointment of official campaign actors (Zappettini, 
2019a). Overall, the majority of press coverage of the referendum “was heavily 
skewed in favour of Brexit” (Levy et al., 2016, p.33) and “the right- wing tabloids 
tended to set the agenda, forcing more authoritative and impartial media – notably 
the BBC – to follow suit” (Buckledee, 2018:204; see also Seaton, 2016).  Of all the 
bestselling British newspapers, the Daily Mail featured the highest number of articles 
on the EU referendum and the Daily Express the most front pages titles (Levy et al. 
2016 ). The tabloid press bias towards the Leave message thus meant that the themes 
of the Leave camp got amplified and had more exposure with a larger readership than 
those of the Remain side which, on the other hand, relied  on less emotionally 
appealing arguments based on ‘cold arguments’ and economic data (Zappettini, 
2019a). Moreover, whilst in line with the official Leave and Remain campaigns the 
economy was the overall most discussed topic in the general press, British tabloids 
tended to recontextualise economic arguments within discursive frames of migration, 
security and sovereignty (Moore and Ramsay, 2017) which effectively echoed and 
amplified the official campaign’s dominant topoi of threat and risk (avoidance) 
(Zappettini, 2019a). Finally one must consider the increasing traction of online news. 




been able to retain their audience shares but they have in fact increased their reach 
when one considers their presence on platforms such as Google and Facebook while 
some quality (and mostly Remain endorsing) papers are available only through 
paywall subscriptions. So for example the Leave supporting Mail Online and the Sun 
Online were the second and third most accessed news website after the BBC in 2016 
reaching 68% and 64% of the UK digital audience respectively while the Remain 
endorsing Mirror Online was trailing behind in fifth place at 52% (Ofcom, 2017). 
Having provided a brief contextualisation of the mediatisation of the Brexit 
referendum campaign, the next sections present a detailed analysis of a sample of 
such discursive productions in the British tabloid press paying specific attention to 




4. Methodology and data 
 
The analysis was conducted abductively via a combination of computational 
linguistic analysis (Partington et al. 2013) and Critical Discourse Analysis 
(Krzyzanowski, 2010) methods. The computational analysis was used to survey a 
large amount of data and to focus on the different semantic boundaries which were 
constructed around the people in a corpus of tabloids articles on Brexit. For this 
purpose five corpora (N=4370 articles) were compiled deriving data from the Nexis 
database in relation to the national editions of the following five titles: The Daily 
Mail (MA); The Sun (SU); The Daily Express (EX); The Daily Mirror (MI); and The 
Daily Star (ST) (as detailed in Table 1). These five tabloids were chosen for their 
different political alignment/Brexit endorsement and because they represent the titles 
with the widest online audience4  (OFCOM, 2017) as well as the highest average 
daily nationwide circulation in their printed version5.  
 
Table 1. Details of corpora analysed. 
 
                                                 
4 Excluding the BBC and quality newspapers. Although The London Evening Standard represents a tabloid publication 
with higher audience reach than EX and ST, it was not included because of its regional rather than national distribution. 
5 Excluding broadsheets and quality press. Source Statista https://www.statista.com/statistics/529060/uk-
newspaper-market-by-circulation/ 
Corpora Title (including Sunday editions) Political/Brexit 
Alignment 
Articles 
analysed   
Total words 
1 –MA Mail on line (dailymail.co.uk) Conservative/Leave a 1570 2244168 
2 - EX Express on line (express.co.uk) UKIP/Leave 1607 1144001 
3 - MI Mirror on line (mirror.co.uk) Labour/Remain 660 454915 
4 - SU The Sun online (thesun.co.uk) b Conservative/Leave 439 210567 
5 - ST Daily Star on line (dailystar.co.uk) None/Leave c 149 79133 
 
a The Mail endorsed Leave; The Mail on Sunday endorsed Remain 







The database Nexis was specifically searched for any co-occurrence of the keywords 
Brexit AND people in the online version of these five publications (including Sunday 
editions) during the time between the official start of the referendum campaign and 
the referendum date (15/4-23/6/2016). Although highly similar articles were filtered 
out using such search option on the Nexis menu, the nature of online news means 
that in some cases results were returned in which certain paragraphs or sections were 
repeated verbatim or with minimal changes either as updated versions of the same 
article or sometimes under different headlines (this for example was particularly 
noticeable in the MA online database). These paragraphs and sections were 
annotated and taken into account to avoid skewing the qualitative analysis towards 
the higher representation of certain arguments (see below). Duplicate articles 
appearing under Scottish and (Northern) Irish versions were also discarded. Articles 
were further searched with AntConc (Anthony, 2018) to map distinct semantic fields 
associated with ‘the people’. This mapping was carried out by interpreting each 
occurrence of the people in the context of a sentence (via the KWIC function) and 
by identifying the main collocates occurring next to (the) people. Articles in which 
(the) people appeared to be used in one of the most typical semantic orientations (see 
figure 1 below) were then analysed at a discursive-pragmatic level with the aim to 
systematically identify: i) the framing of each article, that is the “central organizing 
idea or story line that provides meaning” to events and issues at stake (Gamson & 
Modigliani, 1987, p. 143); ii) the typical argumentative structures used to 
(de)legitimise Brexit in relation to the signifier the people. The framing analysis was 
guided by Entman’s (1993) four salient dimensions of news narrative: problem 
definition, causal analysis, moral judgement and policy recommendation (this last 
dimension ultimately tallying with the Leave/Remain endorsement). The in-depth 
argumentative analysis relied on extant literature on legitimation in discourse (e.g. 
van Leuween, 2007) and in particular Reyes (2011) who suggests legitimation can 
be achieved through discursive strategies leveraging on: (1) emotions (particularly 
fear), (2) a hypothetical future, (3) rationality, (4) voices of expertise and (5) 
altruism. The above categories were treated as general strategic orientations and were 
identified via key topoi deployed in discourse (see Krzyzanowski, 2010).  
An important premise must be made on the identification of arguments in 
relation to the actors involved in their (re)production. While a relatively small 
number of articles consisted of opinion columns explicitly aimed at evaluating the 
campaign arguments, the large majority of articles constructed news around the ‘soft’ 
content of ‘X said Y’. Narratives of most articles therefore were driven by a 
macrosyntax (van Dijk, 2013) ‘repackaging’ reported speech (e.g. large quotes from 
politicians, official lines from campaign representatives and, in some cases, 
endorsements from celebrities and vox pops). As the recontextualization of reported 
speech still relies on the journalists’ ‘intention work’ (Schreiber and Kampf, 2018) 
to construct newsworthiness around authority view from specific evaluative angles, 
however towards the end it came out in support of Leave 
  c As the online version of The Sun is only available on the Nexis database for articles after 22/6/2016, the SU database was scraped 




articles were treated as units of context in which editorial framing - aligning with the 
explicit political stance of a newspaper - would conceivably use commentary and 
reported speech intertextually to legitimise the macro argument for/against Brexit via 






5.1 Corpus Linguistics Analysis: Main collocates of (the) people 
 
 
Results from the collocation analysis (summarised in Table 2) show that the 
most frequent co-occurrences of Brexit and people were found in the MA and the EX 
corpora which is consistent with the two titles featuring the highest number of 
general articles on Brexit among the press (Levy et al 2016) although here they 
clearly featured different words-per-article ratios. The analysis also showed that, 
overall, the qualifier British was the most frequent collocate of people, followed by 
young, working, million, many, more, and ordinary. 
 




 EX MA MI SU ST total 
British 272 232 102 75 19 700 
young 130 116 89 21 6 362 
many 84 69 33 21 13 220 
working 49 32 60 12  153 
more 50  28 24 6 108 
most 31 27 11 16  85 
ordinary 35 19  7  61 
come/came/coming/are 
coming 
19   36  55 
movement of 7    7 14 
people from 12     12 
the number of people 
who 
12     12 
a lot of people 11     11 
our 9     9 
millions of people 6     6 
The people of Britain 6     6 
The people of this 
country 






One very conspicuous pattern emerged from further analysis on the 
distribution of the most frequent collocates in the pro-Brexit press. The generic term 
people was used in discourse to characterise two distinct categories: the us group of 
people on one hand and their antagonists (the them group of people) on the other as 
illustrated in Figure 1. People belonging to the us group were linguistically 
characterised as British, young6, working and ordinary while their antagonists (the 
them-group) were differently nominalised and attributed different predicates. These 
different characterisations can be conveniently grouped into the following three main 
semantic clusters: i) (EU) migrants free to move; ii) the elites/establishments; and 
iii) a third less semantically homogenous group of antagonists comprising of 
‘Remainers’, the ‘Scots’ and the ‘Irish’. 
 
 





                                                 











































This antagonistic discursive framing is discussed further in the discursive pragmatic 
analysis below with a specific focus on the most frequent argumentative and 
linguistic realisations that characterise the corpora. The discussion will highlight in 
particular the discursive dynamics of fear, resentment and empowerment of the 
people through which Brexit was legitimised.  
 
5.2 Discursive Pragmatic Analysis 
 
5.2.1 Antagonistic representations of ‘the British people’ vs. ‘immigrants’  
 
This framing was typically realised via the juxtaposition of a group of actors (often 
qualified as British people and sometimes as the people of Britain, the people of this 
country or our people) with a group of opposed actors frequently nominalised as: 
(EU) (im)migrants, EU citizens, or people from (followed by a geopolitical noun e.g. 
Poland or Eastern Europe) and often qualified as free to move. This latter group was 
also frequently nominalised via the following lexical clusters: the number of people 
who, many/more/ a lot of/millions of people and such linguistic attributions were 
typically associated with the predicate (have) come/came/(are) coming. In essence, 
such linguistic characterisations and antagonistic representations sustained the 
overall framing of the us-British group as negatively impacted by immigration, a 
discourse which was primarily predicated on two main macro arguments. The first 
macro argument claimed that immigrants, enabled by Europe’s free movement rules, 
deplete ‘British’ resources (jobs, housing, welfare, health and education and other 
public services) resulting in the us-British group often losing out and being worse 
off/left behind. The second macro argument associated immigration with different 
public security risks to which the us-British group would be much more vulnerable 
if the UK remained in the EU (see below). In both arguments, the negative 
consequences of immigration were discursively traced back to a socio-political 
system ‘out of control’ (often represented as the result of the EU imposing rules on 
the UK but also as a complicit ‘elitist affair’ between Brussels and Westminster) and 
Brexit was thus legitimised along the Leave campaign macro argumentative scheme 
of ‘taking back control’ (see Zappettini, 2019a). For example, a Daily Mail article 
on 2/6/2016 quotes prominent Leave campaigner Liam Fox on the alleged negative 
impact of uncontrolled (runaway) immigration on the young British and on the 
housing system. The argument - realised via the conditional sentence ‘if, then’ - 
legitimised Brexit through strategies of fear and risk and via representations of a 
negative hypothetical future which were predicated on the topos/fallacy of numbers 
and mass migration (Zappettini, 2019a), i.e. on the implicit assumption that millions 
of Europeans citizens entitled to move to the UK (as well as Turkish nationals whom, 
it was implied, would be soon granted similar rights) would exercise their right of 
movement: 
 
(1) “England will need to build a new home every SIX MINUTES 
to keep up with runaway immigration if voters reject Brexit” 




[emphasis added – henceforth EA] would be stuck living with 
their parents for longer – unable to find or afford a home” 
(Daily Mail, 2/6/2016)  
The same argument of the ‘social housing crisis’ driven by immigration was also 
found in a Daily Express article authored by England cricketer Sir Ian Botham where 
his nostalgic vision of ‘green’ Britain at risk of being ‘concreted over’ to 
accommodate millions of migrants (cf. topos of mass migration) parallels the 
political discourse of lost sovereignty as British people are ‘told what to do by other 
people’ (thus reinforcing representations of the UK and the EU as two antagonistic 
groups of people). Legitimation is also achieved via reference to a hypothetical 
negative future (a ‘full’ and ‘overbuilt’ Britain) which is contrasted with the 
mythopoesis (van Leuween, 2007) of Britain’s ‘golden age’ (cf. Girardet, 1990 for 
such prototypical myth in populist discourses): 
 
(2) “I grew up with green fields around me that I could run around 
and play in. Britain was a country that could look after itself 
and it did not have to do what other people[EA]  told it to do. 
[…] Even with migration continuing "just" at its current level 
we will have to build a new house every six minutes for the next 
20 years. Our beautiful countryside is what makes Britain the 
place it is and this island was not designed for 100 million 
people [EA]. I don't want to see it concreted over just because 
we have no control over our borders” 21/6/2016 Daily Express 
 
Overall, most pro-Brexit articles framed immigration as a problem that the 
Government must but are unable to control since the UK is bound to European rules. 
A Daily Mail article ‘revealing’ how Prime Minister's ex-closest aide Steve Hilton 
had warned Mr. Cameron that achieving low immigration targets was incompatible 
with EU membership quotes Hilton’s view of the’ immigration system as ‘broken’. 
Building on the victimisation of the UK, the discourse here also highlights the 
resentment of the ‘British people’ (once more juxtaposed to ‘other people’) to 
legitimise Brexit as an emotional response to the immigration ‘issue’.   
(3) “ ..the immigration system is a social disaster because the 
decency and tolerance of the British people [EA]... are mocked 
when they see their local communities and public services 
overwhelmed by sudden and unplanned-for arrivals of people 
[EA] in large numbers'. (Daily Mail, 21/6/16) 
 
Similarly, the legitimacy of Brexit in relation to the ‘question of uncontrolled 
immigration’ was frequently argued by the Daily Express. For example, reporting on 
the release of official immigration figures, one article stated that such figures could 




legitimised a vote for Leave by invoking again  the risky scenario of mass migration 
(through the rhetorical question ‘how long’):  
 
(4) “It is only a matter of time before the Eurozone crisis deepens 
and even more people [EA] flee to Britain in search of jobs. 
Meanwhile how long will it be until the migrants from Africa 
and the Middle East are granted citizenship by their new 
European homes? When that day comes they too will be free to 
come and live here. Getting out of the EU has never been more 
important.” (Daily Express, 27/5/2016) 
 
The Sun echoed the dominant Leave argument on immigration pressure. For 
example, an editorial piece (13/6/2016) invokes once again the topos of a mass 
migration crisis by referring to the numbers of people who have acquired British 
citizenship (mistakenly compounding EU with extra-EU immigration and British/EU 
citizenship) and by linguistically realising the gravity of such scenario via the ‘state 
as container’ metaphor in the title “Britain's creaking borders are under huge pressure 
with nearly 100 migrants getting a passport every hour”. Appealing to this framing, 
Brexit was legitimised as the only possible way to reduce/eliminate such pressure. 
In some cases the moral panic constructed around the ‘threats’ of immigration was 
reified with vivid and overtly xenophobic tones. For example, the Daily Express 
reported Farage’s comments on ‘Cologne-style sex attacks’7 in which the politician 
associates immigration with security risk, a premise that underpinned the 
legitimation of Brexit as the only way for ‘ordinary British people’ to protect 
themselves from such threat. Once more, this argument relies on the fallacy of mass 
migration and on misrepresentations of freedom of movement that were largely 
deployed by the Leave campaign (Zappettini, 2019a) leveraging on representation of 
a vulnerable UK inside the EU and appealing to strategies of fear and resentment as 
exemplified by extract (5) in which immigration is further associated with social 
‘dumping’: 
 
(5) Asked whether mass sex attacks like those in Cologne could 
occur in the UK, he said: "It depends if they get EU passports. 
It depends if we vote for Brexit or not…EU open borders are 
not just a security risk but have led to a level of migration never 
seen before in our country that has been bad for social 
cohesion, damaged the quality of life for millions of ordinary 
British people [EA] who have seen their wages compressed and 
Britain's infrastructure placed under huge strain too.” (Daily 
Express, 6/6/2016) 
 
                                                 





In contrast to the above negative representations of (EU) immigration, the Daily 
Mirror’s framing of freedom of movement was more balanced and overall positive 
(however see 5.2.3 for mixed representations of immigration in relation to the labour 
market). For example, a DM article (19/4) reports Labour MP Seema Malhotra’s 
view that, rather being the victims of immigration (see extract 1 above), young 
people are benefitting from freedom of movement, a representation that supports 
Malhotra’s appeal to older people to ‘listen to the young’ and vote Remain. 
 
(6) “[The young] cherish the freedom to travel, to learn, to 
experience all that Europe has to offer. When they think about 
migration, they can see it in terms of the opportunity for 
themselves. There are as many Britons living in mainland 
Europe as there are people from other European countries 
[EA] living here. Young people [EA] are convinced that their 




5.2.2 Antagonistic representations of ‘the British people’ vs. the 
establishment/elites 
 
Alongside the antagonization of immigrants, the pro-Brexit press also relied on 
frequent discursive frames which pitted the ‘British people’ against different 
elite/establishment enemies. Typical nominalisations in this sense included ‘outside’ 
enemies such as the EU bureaucrats (often metonymically referred to as Brussels), 
the IMF, Obama, as well as ‘inside’ enemies such as Westminster (a metonymical 
reference to the British government), the then Prime Minister David Cameron and 
Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne, experts and Remainers. Most articles 
typically represented the British people as vexed by one or more of the above 
‘enemies’ either on a long-term basis (e.g the EU) or within the contingencies of the 
Brexit campaign (e.g. President Obama). In both cases a vote for Brexit was 
legitimised as a form of (re)empowerment (‘taking back control’) over imagined 
oppressors of the people as well as a reaffirmation of the British (English) national 
character/pride. This framing thus relied primarily on emotive strategies tapping into 
both populist and nationalist dimensions. For example the Daily Express (13/5/2016) 
reported how the IMF was planning to release a report on the possible economic 
impact of Brexit under the headline ‘Fury as IMF plan ANOTHER Brexit report to 
'bully' voters a WEEK before EU referendum’. The article is constructed around the 
then Minister for Employment and prominent Leave advocate Preti Patel’s response 
to the IMF forthcoming report: 
(7) “It appears the Chancellor is cashing in favours to Ms Lagarde 
in order to encourage the IMF to bully the British people [EA] 
[…] The EU-funded IMF should not interfere in our democratic 




A similar framing leveraging on Brexit as reversing the elites’ ‘bullying’ of the people 
was adopted by the Daily Mail in relation to PM Cameron’s decision to knight a number 
of (mainly pro-Remain) individuals. The article frames such action as an abuse of power 
aimed at skewing the referendum debate in the Government’s favour. The article reports 
senior Labour MP and chair of the Vote Leave campaign Gisela Stuart’s comments as 
follows: 
 
(8) “David Cameron and George Osborne have used every single 
ounce of their power to try to bully and frighten the British 
people [EA] into backing their campaign to keep us in the EU” 
[…] I think the British people [EA] are sick and tired of it” 
(Daily Mail, 10/6/16) 
 
The same news was reported by the Daily Express under the usual ‘fury’ headline (‘Fury 
as Cameron accused of handing gongs to pro EU candidates’). In this case, the EX 
extended Ms. Stuart’s comments as reported in the Daily Mail (see above) to include the 
following line: 
 
(9) "The British people [EA] simply aren't going to tolerate being 
told what to do anymore by Brussels, by Cameron, or his newly-
honoured accomplices.” (Daily Express, 11/6/2016) 
 
The framing of Brexit as an enactment of British pride was prominent and often adopted 
by a number of articles in relation to strategies that typically appealed to emotions of 
national resistance, and standing up to the people’s opponents/bullies. For example, the 
Daily Mail quoted Pro-Brexit Tory MP Andrew Bridgen who, commenting on a trivial 
‘smear attack’ on Boris Johnson that “was 'undoubtedly' sanctioned by No10”, praised 
the bravery of the British people against Remainers: 
(10) “The desperate Remain campaign are now resorting to 
personal attacks and smears because they have actually lost the 
argument. I'm very proud that the British people [EA] are not 
being cowed by Project Fear.” (Daily Mail, 10/6/16) 
 
In some cases the contingency of Brexit arguments tapped into historical discourses to 
construct enemies outside Westminster and beyond Britain’s borders. For example, a 
Daily Mail editorial by Toby Young titled ‘Britain’s proud voters don’t take well to 
empty threats, Mr President: We will make up own minds when it comes to Brexit’ 
(24/4/2016) discusses USA President Obama’s statement that, in case Brexit occurred, 
Britain ‘should go to the back to the queue’ (i.e. it would receive no preferential 
commercial treatment). The article draws on the topos of the special relationship between 
the UK and the United States to suggest that the former has always stood by the latter,  
especially in times of war,  and to disappointedly note that such support has not been 




American support with President Roosevelt’s backing in 1941 when ‘Britain stood 
virtually alone against Hitler’, this latter historical reference being traditionally part of 
tabloids’ rhetoric on Blighty. Drawing on the war metaphor that likens UK’s past 
enemies with current Brexit opponents (Germany/the EU) the articles appeals to the 
indomitable ‘British spirit’ to conclude: 
(11) “…the British people [EA] don’t respond well to threats. 
We will make up our own minds on June 23 and President 
Obama’s intervention has probably made it just that little bit 
more likely that we’ll vote to Leave.” (Daily Mail, 24/4/16) 
The patriotic nature of Brexit was also a dominant theme in The Sun where Brexit was 
frequently advocated through the framing of freedom and independence and by urging 
readers to ‘Beleave’ in Britain and vote out. Freedom was typically interpreted in reference 
to the ‘dominant’ nature of EU political system with frequent interdiscursive reference to 
Britain’s role in World War Two in a similar manner to other Leave endorsing titles (see 
above) which likened the EU to the Nazi invader/oppresser. For example, an article (The 
Sun, 20/6/2016) framing Brexit as a renewed battle Britain has been fighting with the 
‘continent’ pleads with the readership to vote Leave with the same WW2 defiant ‘Dunkirk 
spirit’ and as ‘not to give away what [older people/veterans] fought for’: 
 
(12) 'We saved Europe once and now we can do it again by 
voting Leave,' say vets […] Meeting the vets at a Berkshire 
airfield yesterday, Brexit backing Minister Priti Patel said she 
was “honoured”. “These people [EA] fought for our country, 
and on Thursday we need to vote for our democracy,” she said. 
(The Sun, 20/6/2016) 
 
Finally, national pride was also combined with the ‘British exceptionalism’ to project a 
positive future scenario of Brexit drawing conspicuously from the topos of global Britain 
(see Zappettini, 2019b). For example, in an article by David Wooding  published in The 
Sun (15/06/2016) dedicated to prominent Leave campaigner Priti Patel touring the UK, 
the case for Brexit is made intertextually via the authors’ stance on the Leave argument 
and Patel’s reported speech. Along with reference to and support for the key arguments 
on immigration (see examples above), Brexit is framed and legitimised both through 
strategies aimed at representing freedom (from EU rules and Westminster elites) and 
control/empowerment as well as through representations of British citizens (collectively 
referred to via the possessive ‘our people’) being better off outside the EU (such positive 
scenario realised by reversing the ‘leap in the dark’ metaphor to counter the argument of 
leaving as a risky decision).  
(13) “Is there a risk Britain could founder without EU 
support? She replies: "We're the world's fifth largest economy. 
Our people [EA] are great innovators, highly creative, 
entrepreneurial. It's an insult that they are being patronised by 




secure and prosperous future outside the EU because of our 
ability to do business in the world. Voting to leave wouldn't be a 




5.2.3 Antagonistic representations of ordinary/working people’s interests  
 
The framing of Brexit in relation to the best interests of the ‘ordinary/working 
people’ was another frequent discursive realisation across the corpora. This framing 
typically represented certain social groups – identified as ‘ordinary’ (i.e. ‘non-elite’) 
and ‘(hard-)working’ - as negatively/positively affected and/or dis/empowered by 
the referendum vote.  Articles adopting this framing typically (de)legitimised Brexit 
around the argumentative scheme: ‘working/ordinary people are better off in/out (of) 
the EU’. Notably, the argument against Brexit was advocated by the Daily Mirror 
(perhaps expectedly for a title that has always supported the Labour Party the MI 
was the publication that most frequently used ‘working’ as a collocate of people). At 
the same time, however, all the other publications supported Brexit8 as an ideological 
and pragmatic choice that worked in the interest of ‘ordinary/working’ people by 
making use of topoi typically associated with right and left wing ideologies. Most 
tabloids supporting Brexit tended to reproduce the key Leave arguments on 
immigration and control and the supposed benefits of leaving the EU for 
ordinary/working people deriving from the UK ‘freeing’ itself  from the EU rule 
(topos of control). While in some articles this was achieved by relying on strategies 
of fear and by representing negative scenarios (invoking the consequences of Britain 
having to accept unfavourable EU decisions), voting Brexit was often framed as a 
great opportunity for the ordinary/working people through a discursive mix of 
arguments premised on antagonistic representations of groups interests (the Brits vs. 
the European immigrants) and neoliberal economics (e.g. lower taxes). For example, 
The Sun (30/5/2016) published an article authored by Boris Johnson and Michael 
Gove in which it was claimed: 
(14)”… working people [EA] will be better off if we leave the EU. 
The NHS will be stronger, class sizes smaller and taxes lower. We'll 
have more money to spend on our priorities, wages will be higher 
and fuel bills will be lower.  Leaving the EU is a great opportunity 
for us to take back control of our borders, our economy and our 
democracy.” (The Sun, 30/5/2016) 
While this article frames Brexit as a necessary choice for the implementation of a 
right wing agenda, a number of Leave endorsing titles also appealed to more left 
wing ideologies. For example, Richard Littlejohn (in the Daily Mail 21/6/2016) 
frames the question of control and sovereignty by juxtaposing not only ‘ordinary’ 
and ‘working’ people to the EU political establishment (as discussed in section 5.2.2 
                                                 




above) but also by appealing to the identities and interests of working people vis-à-
vis powerful economic actors and by causally linking the suffering of the former to 
the EU ‘superstate’: 
 
(15)”We face a stark choice. Do we vote to become once more the 
ultimate masters of our own destiny, with the power to make our 
laws and control our own borders? Or do we conclude that we are 
incapable of running our own affairs and are better off as a meek 
dependency of an ever-expanding European superstate? That's the 
nub of the argument […]On one side, the vested interests of Luvvie 
Land, big business, merchant banks and almost the entire political 
class. On the other, ordinary working people [EA] excluded from 
the system and the corridors of power and condemned to suffer 
from the worst excesses of the EU juggernaut.” (Daily Mail 
21/6/2016) 
 
In a similar manner, The Sun appealed to ‘working people’ from a left-wing 
perspective in an article (9/6/2016) authored by Labour MP for Bassetlaw John Mann 
(whom the Sun dubbed ‘Mann of the people’). As the MP represents his own stance 
as being in support of the ‘working class interests’, antagonistic representations of 
people are constructed to justify Brexit via different argumentative strategies. In line 
with previous examples, representations of rivalry between ‘ordinary people’ and 
‘the elite’ as well as representations of the negative consequences of 
immigration/free labour of movement (causally linked to the EU) are prominent. 
Crucially, the anti-elite and anti-immigration sentiments are combined to construct 
antagonism not only between EU and British workers but also internally to the UK 
in relation to the uneven distribution of wealth. The ordinary/working people are thus 
mobilised in the politics of loss and resentment which constructs Brexit as a 
revolution restoring their lost power:  
 
 (16)“people [EA] [in Westminster] have been terrified about talking 
about immigration. But on polling day they are going to get a big shock 
across the country […] Because a people’s revolution [EA] is under 
way. This is about returning power to the people [EA]. […] the free 
movement of people [EA] […] has, is, and will continue to undermine 
pay and conditions in working class communities. […] It has created 
two kinds of people [EA] in this country: the people who gain from this 
and the people who lose out [EA]. […]If you live in London and you 
want a cheap nanny, and a gardener and a cheaper plumber you can 
get really nice, really good people [EA] cheaper than you could before 
[…]. In the North of England, in the Midlands, in South Wales, people 
do not get those benefits. They get the problems […] And that is not 





Another example of how The Sun framed the choice over Brexit by ‘interpellating’ 
and mobilising individuals who would recognise themselves as working class was 
found in an  article titled “Power to the people” (11/5/2016) which reports 
Conservative MP Ian Duncan Smith’s view that the “EU helps rich and hurts 
workers”.  Trading on the argument that the depression of wages is caused by ‘huge 
influxes’ of  immigrant cheap labour - and warning it would get worse in future due 
to Turkey and Albania joining the EU - the article legitimizes Brexit along a 
seemingly altruistic strategy of social justice that yet restricts the boundaries of 
solidarity to the nation: 
 
(17) “THE EU's open-door migration policies are screwing British 
workers” while the richest benefit […] My plea to better-off Britons 
who have done well in recent years is to consider using their vote in the 
referendum to vote for a better deal for people [EA] who haven't 
enjoyed the same benefits as them. […] When you vote on 23rd June - 
even if you believe what you are being told by those who want to 
remain in the EU, that you may have done OK in the EU - think about 
the people [EA] who haven't." (The Sun, 11/5/2016) 
 
While all pro-Brexit tabloids (implicitly or explicitly) tended to almost 
exclusively  refer to ‘working/ordinary’ people as British nationals, the 
discourses of the anti-Brexit press (represented by the Daily Mirror and the 
Mail on Sunday) focused on framing the benefits of remaining in the Single 
Market around the safeguarding of workers’ rights (such as maternity leave, 
paid-holidays, pensions for part-time workers and a 48-hour week) that had 
been achieved within a European/transnational socio-political context of 
cooperation. In a few cases therefore articles appealed to strategies of 
transnational solidarity and altruism, however, by and large, the case for 
rejecting Brexit was primarily made by the pro-Remain press through 
domestic, rather than a pan-European framing. For example Brexit was seen 
as regressive for worker’s rights but also as favouring a Tory government 
(Daily Mirror, 28/4/16). Similarly, the Mirror’s final endorsement for 
Remain (21/6/2016) appeals to the ‘greatness’ of Britain and its history (as 
well as a rejection of UKIP’s divisive politics) suggesting a domestic or at 
least international rather than transnational framing: 
 
(18) it is the working people [EA] of this nation who made Britain 
Great. It is the working people[EA]  who laboured in the mills 
and mines that powered the engines of Empire. It is the working 
people [EA] sent "over the top" who won us two world wars 
against unimaginable odds. …And working people [EA] should 
not allow Farage and co to trade the Great Britain they built 








This paper has suggested that the media have played a pivotal role in the Brexit 
campaign and its unfolding. Tabloids in particular have provided a crucial link to the 
legitimation chain of Brexit by constructing discursive frames that, in synergy with 
the discourses of other institutional and public actors and through the cumulative 
effect of audience priming, contributed to legitimise Brexit along populist and 
nationalist logics as the ‘will of the (British) people’. Consistent with historical 
stances and specific Leave endorsements during the campaign, the analysis has 
identified The Daily Mail9, The Daily Express and The Sun as the most active and 
vociferous titles which legitimised Brexit by invoking specific antagonistic 
representations of the people. As the analysis has shown, the framing of most articles 
in the Mail-Express-Sun ‘triad’ hailed and mobilised the people through their 
linguistic characterisation as ‘British’, ‘working and ordinary’ in opposition to other 
groups of people, namely immigrants and the elites. This study has thus highlighted 
how the British tabloids voiced a British ‘imagined community’ and how they 
contributed to reify the nation’s ‘imagined enemies’ both externally (e.g. the EU as 
a dominant power) and internally (e.g. the ‘corrupt’ elites supporting the European 
project). This framing of the Brexit referendum debate tapped into, circulated and 
amplified existing discourses along a populist agenda of ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ 
(De Cleen and Stravakakis, 2017) divisiveness and through the typical tabloid 
language of ‘scandal’ and ‘fury’. The discursive analysis has also suggested that the 
tabloids’ antagonistic framing of the people relied on discursive strategies that 
primarily appealed to emotions of fear, resentment and empowerment. The 
overarching frame adopted by the Mail-Express-Sun ‘triad’ was thus to mobilise and 
legitimise Brexit as an ideological response to the above representations of threat and 
resentment. This response appealed to a populist rhetoric that was largely grounded 
in an exclusionary rather than an inclusionary form of populism (Mudde and 
Kaltwasser, 2013). So, rather than contributing positively towards an inclusive 
conceptualisation/articulation of the people, the data has suggested that the people’s 
empowerment constructed in the Brexit debate by the Mail-Express-Sun ‘triad’ was 
in fact fuelled by exclusionary discourses of rupture between Britain and the EU, 
whether it be ‘ordinary’ people restoring sovereignty, ‘getting rid’ of the Brussels 
(and Westminster) ‘elites’, or finally realising the full mercantile potential of ‘global 
Britain’ outside the constraints of the EU project. The data has also highlighted the 
manipulative use of ‘immigration issues’ with Brexit constructed by the three 
tabloids as a nationalist (in some cases xenophobic) reaction to the moral panic over 
immigration. 
Compared to the Mail-Express-Sun ‘triad’, the other two titles in the corpora 
analysed presented very different stances. While the Daily Star’s overall reporting of 
Brexit was marginal and disengaged, The Daily Mirror (the only Remain supporting 
voice with the Mail on Sunday) mainly appealed to strategies of social cohesion and 
                                                 





solidarity around the ‘working people’. However, while a limited number of MI’s 
pro-Remain arguments conceived of the people in a pan-European/transnational 
dimension, the delegitmation of Brexit was often framed within the logic of national 
interest/ the interest of British workers.  Moreover, while the MI corpus was 
characterised by a higher reference to ‘working people’ than any other title,  ‘working 
people’ was a rhetorical device conspicuously used by right-wing tabloids too, 
especially the Sun. In this respect the analysis has shown how Leave endorsing 
tabloids in fact mobilised rhetorically the term ‘working people’ giving continuity to 
the Conservatives’ ‘hard-working families’ discourses of the last decade but also 
appealing to ‘Lexit’ arguments - that is the case for Brexit made from the left 
ideology of class struggle - showing that the Brexit question cuts through party 
loyalties and readership and reflects how both Labour and Conservative Parties have 
been split within themselves on the Brexit referendum. 
The analysis has also highlighted how strategies appealing to the voices of expertise 
(Reyes, 2010) were effectively only applied by the tabloid press insofar as the 
recontextualisation of reported speech of different political actors involved in the 
campaign (rather than ‘external’ experts) helped construct narratives that fitted the 
overarching tabloid’s pro Leave/Remain stance with the whole newsworthiness of 
most articles relying simply on ‘which Leave/Remain actor said what’ to support 
either camp.  In this sense, however, tabloids did not simply act as communicative 
platforms in the Brexit referendum. As they amplified (or silenced) selected actors 
of the referendum campaign by staging newsworthiness around these personalities 
and their messages, they also effectively (de)legitimised Brexit along their own 
ideological populist/nationalist agenda. 
A wider consideration relating to the points discussed so far in this section is the 
wider question of the instrumental role that a large section of the British tabloid press 
has had not simply in the contingency of the referendum but also in the longer-term 
‘legitimacy chain’ of Brexit and in its institutionalisation (Zappettini & 
Krzyzanowski, 2019). Crucially, the amplification of the key Leave arguments 
capitalised on tabloids’ historical anti-EU/populist discourses that had extensively 
primed the readership with a normalisation of Brexit long before the referendum 
became a reality. 
 
Consistent with such diachronic approach to the role of media, one must consider 
that, far from being over, the (de)legitimazion of Brexit in the name of the people 
has been one of the key drivers of public and institutional discourses since the 
referendum result with the tabloids still being powerful actors in circulating specific 
discourses and (de)legitimizing specific logics/interpretations of Brexit. Tracing the 
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